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THE SWEDISH PENSION REFORM
Steven Glassman
There is growing concern that the U.S.
Social Security System will be unable to pro-
vide income to retirees in the future in the
manner it does today. Similar fears prevail
across the globe as many developed nations
worry that their public pension systems are not
sustainable. The trend is primarily a result of
increases in the proportion of the population
eligible for benefits. Some nations have already
implemented reforms to deal with this prob-
lem, and it seems practical to examine their
experiences. 
The public pension system in Sweden was
reformed through a series of legislative deci-
sions starting in 1994. The reform was a
response to changing economic and demo-
graphic conditions that had threatened to
necessitate unacceptably high contribution
rates from the nation’s labor force. Advocates
of the reform claim that the new system is capa-
ble of enduring severe financial downturns and
unforeseeable fluctuations in the population;
however, most would acknowledge that it has
its downsides.
In the following analysis, I describe
Sweden’s old system and examine why it need-
ed to be overhauled. I then discuss the new sys-
tem’s characteristics and assess how successful
the reform has been, noting who the real win-
ners and losers are. 
The Old System
Benefit Evolution
The system that has been replaced dates
back to 1913. Although it has been described as
the origin of Sweden’s universal welfare pro-
tection, it originally provided only means-test-
ed benefits that excluded portions of the popu-
lation. It was not until 1946 that the system
became truly universal, offering benefits of
equal amount to all individuals of pension-
receiving age. (Palme, p. 1) This flat-rate ben-
efit was equal to 96 percent of a base amount.
One base amount was approximately one-fifth
the average earnings of a full-time worker and
was 36,400 SEK ($4,652) in 1998.1 In order to
maintain its financial viability, the base amount
was indexed to changes in the cost of living.
(Scherman, p. 4)
In 1960, the universal benefit was com-
1Using an exchange rate of 7.825 SEK/U.S. $, the rate
prevalent on June 1, 1998.
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bined with an earnings-related supplement.
Individuals who had worked for at least 30 years
were guaranteed an annual pension based upon
their best 15 years of employment, adjusted for
inflation. (Sundén, p. 2) In 1998, the average
earnings of a full-time worker was about
182,000 SEK. (Scherman, p. 4) Taking into
account that this value does not represent a
worker’s average earnings over his best 15
years, a very crude estimate of the average earn-
ings-related supplement is about 109,200 SEK
($13,955). The value of this supplement was
capped at 7.5 times the base amount ($34,890).
(Scherman, p. 4) Together, the universal bene-
fit and earnings-related supplement were
designed to replace 60 percent of income. 
Shortly after the first earnings-related
pensions were distributed, those not entitled to
them began lobbying for increased benefits.
Another supplement, approximately half the
size of the flat-rate benefit, was guaranteed for
individuals ineligible for a significant earnings-
related benefit. Individuals who typically
received this supplement included the disabled
and the long-term unemployed. The old system
contributed to Sweden’s relatively equal income
distribution and lack of poverty among the
elderly. 
Pension Plan Design
The flat-rate and earnings-related
schemes within the old system were pay-as-
you-go and defined benefit. The government
financed the flat-rate benefit (and the supple-
ment typically received by the poor) with gen-
eral revenues and payroll taxes on employers.
The earnings-related supplement was financed
by payroll tax contributions on employers and
employees; however, until the mid-1990s,
financing was done entirely by contributions
from employers on the total wage bill and with-
out any ceiling, even though pension benefits
were capped. (Scherman, p. 5)
When the earnings-related supplement
was designed in 1960, contribution levels were
intentionally set higher than necessary to cover
benefits. This was done in order to create a safe-
guard against fluctuations in the contribution
rate and to offset the macroeconomic downside
of decreasing incentives for private savings. The
excess funds were invested by the state under
certain rules. Specifically, 85 percent of the
funds were restricted mainly to government
bonds and housing bonds, traditionally assets
with low risk and long duration; it was not until
1974 that the funds were allowed to be invest-
ed in stocks. At the end of 1998, these excess
funds amounted to about 40 percent of GDP.
(Sundén, p. 3)
Problems with the Old System
The old system was not free of equity
issues. For example, the design of the earnings-
related supplement calculation had a regressive
impact, and the design of the flat-rate 
minimum supplement provided incentives for
some low-income workers to avoid work and
live off welfare. Nevertheless, the driving 
force for reform was the anticipated rise in 
contribution rates necessary to cope with 
an aging population and potential economic
downturns. 
The Threat of Demographic
Changes
As in many industrialized nations, the life
expectancy of the average citizen in Sweden has
increased due to technological advances in
health-related fields. As Swedes live longer, pen-
sion beneficiaries will receive their benefits for
a longer span of time unless the retirement age
is increased. (See Table 1.) Holding all else con-
stant, this alone would require the contribu-
tion rate of the workforce to increase in the old
system. 
Table 1
Projected Average Retirement Period by Gender
Year 2000 2010 2030
Males 18.7 19.4 20.6
Females 23.2 23.9 25.4  
Source: “Living Happily Ever After…,” p. 7. 
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Meanwhile, however, the nation’s popula-
tion growth rate and immigration rate have
been declining. Sweden has experienced a birth
rate of just under two children per woman dur-
ing most of the past century. This rate is slight-
ly below that necessary for reproducing the
population and significantly below that needed
for increasing the labor force enough to sup-
port the predicted increase in longevity.
(Palmer, n.d., p. 2) In the past, net immigration
has helped make up for the gap created by
increases in lifespan and decreases in natural
population growth; however, a seemingly unat-
tainable multiple of 3.9 times current immi-
gration levels is necessary in order to offset just
the extent to which fertility has fallen below
population replacement levels. (“Living Happily
Ever After…,” p. 20) Consequently, the portion
of the population that is retired and eligible for
pension benefits is expected to increase as the
portion of the population responsible for pay-
ing the benefits is expected to decrease. (See
Table 2.) 
These facts, when combined with a socia-
bly accepted tendency for aging Swedes to retire
earlier, as reflected in the last column of Table
3, create a second significant threat to the
financial stability of the old system. As more
aging Swedes exit the workforce earlier, not
only are more pensions expected earlier, but
there is also downward pressure on the tax base
that supports these pensions.
The Threat of High Unemployment
The old system required increases in the
contribution rate whenever the proportion of
the population employed decreased, whether it
was due to demographic changes or economic
downturns. One can think of the contribution
rate as the percentage of everyone’s paychecks
taxed to provide pensions to retirees. As fewer
individuals worked, the tax base decreased.
Since benefits were guaranteed and financing
was pay-as-you-go, the contribution rate
imposed on remaining workers was increased
to compensate. For example, during Sweden’s
recession in the early 1990s, the contribution
rate used to fund disability and survivors’ pen-
sions grew from 24.5 percent to 30 percent as
a result of decreased employment levels.
(Scherman, p. 10)
If pensioners tend to spend less than con-
tributors, the old system may have had an
adverse effect on the nation’s economy during
recessions. At such times, Keynesian econom-
ic theory suggests that governments should
lower taxes through fiscal policy in order to
increase consumer spending and stimulate the
economy. Ceteris paribus, however, the old sys-
tem required the government to raise its taxes
during recessions in order to meet its obliga-
tions. Since these taxes were, in effect, being
transferred from the labor force to pensioners,
the aggregate effect on the economy depended
Table 2
Projected Retiree Populations as a Percentage of the Total Population
2000 2010 2020 2030 Percent Growth in 
Percentage Retired 
2000–2030
20.5% 23.8% 27.7% 31.0% 51.2%
Source: “Living Happily Ever After…,” p. 7. 
Table 3
Percentage of Different Age Groups in the Labor Force
Age 16–19 20–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64
Women 28.2 58.8 78.7 86.0 86.7 63.3
Men 25.1 66.5 87.0 89.7 89.7 70.8
Women and Men 26.6 62.7 83.0 87.9 88.2 67.0
Source: “The Swedish Labour Market  —  Facts and Figures,” p. 14. 
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upon the relative propensity of contributors and
pensioners to consume. Thus, the old system
may have had a contractionary effect on GDP
growth. 
The Threat of Decreasing Real
Wage Growth
Another problem with the design of the
old system was that contribution rates were
dependent upon real wage growth. Consider the
differences between the system’s revenues and
expenditures. On the one hand, revenues were
collected as a percentage of current wages. On
the other hand, expenditures were a function
of previous years’ wages adjusted for inflation.
In effect, revenues were wage indexed and
expenditures were price indexed. (Palmer, 2000,
p. 24) Therefore, if everything else were held
constant, the relative cost of financing pensions
from year to year increased if nominal wage
growth was less than inflation (i.e., if the real
wage growth was negative). 
Consider the following example. Imagine
a system with just one pension beneficiary and
one contributor. Assume that nominal wages
increase by $1 per year. Also, assume that the
pension is $0.60 and that it increases with infla-
tion at 33.33 percent per year. When the con-
tributor’s earnings rise at any rate lower than
inflation, the portion of the contributor’s wage
necessary to pay the beneficiary’s pension
increases as shown in Table 4. Note that until
year 4, nominal wage growth is higher than
inflation, and the contribution rate decreases;
however, as soon as real wage growth becomes
negative in year 5, the contribution rate begins
to rise. 
The Issue of Regressive
Redistribution 
The three problems just discussed —
demographic changes, high unemployment,
and decreasing wage growth — were of concern
to policy makers because they directly affected
the labor force contribution rate and the finan-
cial stability of the system. In contrast, the
regressive nature of the old system was more
of an equity problem than a stability concern. 
In a nation with a socialist ideology such
as Sweden, an attitude exists that favors labor
over capital. Nevertheless, the rules of the old
pension system redistributed income from
workers whose earnings did not vary much,
typically blue-collar workers, to individuals
whose earnings were distributed unevenly over
their lifetimes, typically white-collar workers.
(Sundén, p. 4) This redistribution occurred
because workers paid contributions as a per-
centage of earnings across their lifetime but
received benefits based upon their 15 years of
employment with highest earnings. 
To illustrate, consider the following exam-
ple. Suppose that Person A works for 50 years
and earns 15,000 SEK/year, while Person B
Table 4
Illustration of Old System’s Dependence on Real Wage Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Time Nominal Wage Real Wage Real Wage Necessary
Period Nominal Growth Rate Growth Rate in Year 1 Benefit Contribution
(t) Wage (NW) (NWGR) Inflation (I) (RWGR) Dollars (RW) (B) Rate (CRt)
1 $1.00 — — — $1.00 $0.60 60.00%
2 $2.00 100.00% 33.33% 66.67% $1.67 $0.80 40.00%
3 $3.00 50.00% 33.33% 16.67% $1.94 $1.07 35.55%
4 $4.00 33.33% 33.33% 0.00% $1.94 $1.42 35.55%
5 $5.00 25.00% 33.33% –8.33% $1.78 $1.90 37.92%
6 $6.00 20.00% 33.33% –13.33% $1.54 $2.53 42.13%
NWt = 
NWt–1 + $1
NWGRt–1 =
NWt – NWt–1
NWt–1
RWGRt =
NWGRt – It
RWt = RWt–1*
(1 + RWGRt)
Bt = Bt–1*
(1 + It)
CRt =
Bt
NWt
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works for 30 years and earns 20,000 SEK for 
15 years and 30,000 SEK for 15 years. Assuming
a contribution rate of 20 percent and ignoring
discounting, both individuals will contribute
150,000 SEK in social security taxes over their
work lives. Nevertheless, Person A will be enti-
tled to a pension of 9,000 SEK/year while
Person B will be receiving 18,000 SEK/year.
Although this imbalance posed no threat to the
financial stability of the system, many saw this
phenomenon as a serious inequity. 
Other Problems
Additional problems with the old scheme
included its impact on the incentive to save 
and the indexation of the earnings-related ben-
efit ceiling to consumer prices instead of to
wages. In general, there was a growing belief,
particularly among younger workers, that the
system was poorly designed and would be
unable to fulfill its “promises” in the future.
(Palmer, 2000, p. 1)
The New System
Given the design of the old system and its
various problems, the motivation for reform is
clear. As such, many features have been
changed. Sweden’s new public pension system
is divided into three parts:  the guaranteed pen-
sion, the income pension, and the premium
pension. 
The Guaranteed Pension
The guaranteed pension provides a mini-
mum allowance for pensioners and replaces the
old system’s flat-rate minimum universal 
benefit. It is a defined benefit pension 
plan funded on a pay-as-you-go basis. It is esti-
mated to be equivalent to about $10,000 annu-
ally on a before-tax basis (“The Swedish 
Pension Reform”), and it is indexed to the 
consumer price index so that individuals 
dependent upon this minimum benefit are 
protected from inflation. After taxes, it is 
roughly equivalent in value to the flat-rate uni-
versal pension of the old system plus the sup-
plement for individuals with low income.
(Palmer, 2000, p. 21) 
All individuals above age 65 living within
Sweden at least 40 years are entitled to the full
guarantee. Since life expectancies have
increased, the retirement age probably could
have been set higher than 65 (Palmer, n.d., 
p. 12), assuming individuals are remaining
physically fit longer than before. The benefit is
reduced by 1/40 for each year of residence less
than 40. 
The guaranteed amount is reduced 
by about 11 percent for a married pensioner.
Presumably the cost of living for two married
individuals living together is lower than that of
two separate individuals. Although this seems
logical in theory, this policy unintentionally
provides a financial incentive for older, 
more financially sensitive Swedes who would
normally marry to enjoy the benefits of 
sharing costs through means other than 
marriage. 
The Income Pension 
The amount of Sweden’s income pension
is calculated as a function of lifelong contribu-
tions to the system. These contributions come
in the form of a 16 percent tax on pensionable
earnings.2 Each individual has an “account”
which is credited with the amounts one con-
tributes to this pay-as-you-go system.3 These
accounts are referred to as “notional” because
they only have value on paper; there is no spe-
cial trust fund backing the full value of the
accounts. The value of one’s notional account
simply represents what one has contributed 
so that one can receive an appropriate level of
benefits when one retires. The values of the
notional accounts increase each year by an
interest rate equal to the growth rate of real
wages. The National Income Index (NII) is used
to measure this growth rate. (“The Swedish
Pension Reform”) 
In The Financial Stability of Notional
Account Pensions, Salvador Valdés-Prieto dis-
cusses the financial stability of Sweden’s sys-
tem. For the sake of simplicity, he considers a
2Pensionable earnings are defined as all annual income
exceeding the minimum taxable income (approximately
SEK 9,000 or $1,154) and below the ceiling defined within
the pension system (SEK 290,000 or $37,178).
3Credits are also awarded to individuals having children
under the age of four, those doing military service, and stu-
dents at universities.
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system without any reserves where individuals
live for two periods. During the first period of
one’s life, each individual works and contributes
a portion of his earnings to the pay-as-you-go
system. During the second period, he retires
and collects benefits. Mathematically, Mr.
Valdés-Prieto shows the relationship between
benefit levels, pension taxes, and some impor-
tant economic and demographic variables in
the following identities:
At a given time, the system’s expenditures,
E(t+1), are equal to the sum of average wage
growth (1+pt) times (*) the previous period’s
contribution rates, Ct, times the period’s aggre-
gate income, Yt, for all individuals. Average
wage growth can be rewritten as the change in
average earnings from period to period, 
where N is the size of the population, 
is the wage fund in period t, and  
is the wage fund in period t+1. Today’s
revenues, Rt+1, must be equal to the
sum of today’s pensionable earnings times today’s
contribution rate due to the pay-as-you-go nature
of the system’s financing. Therefore, Rt+1/Ct+1
can be substituted for   
As these identities show, the government
can choose to finance pensions by either shift-
ing contribution rates or adjusting benefit lev-
els, assuming it does not want to tamper with
the size of the workforce. If the contribution
rate is varied according to changes in the pop-
ulation so that Ct+1= Ct * (Nt/Nt+1), automatic
financial balance is achieved, since mathemat-
ically Rt+1 equals Et+1. (Valdés-Prieto, p. 404)
However, allowing the contribution rate to fluc-
tuate creates undesirable intergenerational
transfers of income. As a result, Sweden has
opted to allow pension benefits to fluctuate and
to maintain constant contribution rates. 
Once an individual decides to retire, which
can occur at any time after turning age 61, the
individual’s annual benefit is determined by
dividing the value of his notional account by an
annuity factor. This annuity factor is a function
of life expectancy and future wage growth, and
its main purpose is to ensure that the system
meets its obligations without increasing the
contribution rate of the workforce. As life
expectancies increase, pension benefits will
therefore decrease in order to maintain con-
stant contribution rates. One may choose to
retire early and receive lower pension levels for
a longer period of time, or one may choose to
delay one’s retirement in order to obtain high-
er benefits for fewer years.
Ole Settergren, a researcher at the
Swedish National Social Insurance Board, 
has developed an automatic balance mecha-
nism (ABM) to guarantee the income pension
system’s financial self-sufficiency. The system’s
assets must remain greater than its liabilities 
if the system is to survive in the long 
run. Therefore, each year, planners examine 
the relationship between a buffer fund4 and 
the sum of contributions on the one hand 
and the system’s liabilities on the other. 
This relationship is referred to as the balance
ratio. 
.
4Money in the buffer fund comes primarily from the old
pension system’s excess funds. In 2000, it was estimated that
the fund was capable of paying over five years of benefits.
(Palmer, 2000, p. 31) In 2001, the fund’s value was estimat-
ed to be SEK 550 billion. (Settergren, p. 10) This is the
equivalent of about $50.69 billion.
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Mathematically: 
Changes in the value of this ratio can signal the
effects of several economic and demographic
concerns that were previously ignored (for
example, changes in the size of the labor force
and returns on the buffer fund).
In “The Automatic Balance Mechanism of
the Swedish Pension System…,” Mr. Settergren
explains how the ABM works. When the value
of the balance ratio is greater than one, the pen-
sion system is more than capable of meeting its
obligations; however, when the value of the
ratio is less than one, the system is financially
imbalanced. If such a situation were allowed to
persist, the buffer fund would be depleted over
time and the system would be unable to meet
its obligations. Consequently, if the balance
ratio falls below one, the ABM is activated. This
switches the rate at which pensions and notion-
al accounts grow from the National Income
Index, which is (1+p) in the Valdés-Prieto
model, to a balance index. The balance index is
calculated as the product of the wage growth
index and the balance ratio. When the balance
ratio is below one, pensions of those already
retired and notional accounts of those still
working will grow at a slower rate than average
wage growth. On the other hand, when the bal-
ance ratio exceeds one, pensions and notional
accounts will increase at a faster rate than aver-
age wage growth, until the time when the bal-
ance index returns to the same level as the
income index. At that point, the system’s lia-
bilities will return to indexation solely via wage
growth. 
Figure 1, provided in Mr. Settergren’s
work, summarizes how indexation moves from
one method to another and back again. The
darker line plots a hypothetical index level over
time if pensions grow continuously at the same
rate as wage growth. Alternatively, the lighter
line plots a hypothetical path that the index
level could follow over time if the ABM is acti-
vated during year 5. Note that pensions and
notional accounts would grow at a slower rate
than average wage growth from year 5 to year
9, presumably the period through which the
Figure 1
Potential Paths of the Income Index and Balance Index
Source: Settergren, p. 12.
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pension system’s liabilities outweigh its assets.
Once the system’s assets outweigh its liabilities
again in year 9, however, the indexation of pen-
sions and notional accounts would grow more
quickly than average wage growth until the two
hypothetical index levels were equal again, as
in year 13. From that point forward, indexation
would continue solely via wage growth.
The Premium Pension
The third part of the new pension system
is the premium pension. This benefit differs in
form and design from the guarantee and
income pensions. It is a traditional defined con-
tribution plan and is therefore fully funded.
Contributors are taxed at two-and-one-half per-
cent of pensionable earnings each year, which
public and private fund managers invest.
(Sundén, p. 9) Individuals may choose from a
long list of registered domestic and interna-
tional managers, each of whom has negotiated
an agreement about fees and agreed to report-
ing requirements with the Premium Pension
Authority, a government-run agency set up
through the reform. 
Upon retirement, pensioners may choose
between two types of annuities. The first type
has a guaranteed amount. If chosen, one’s accu-
mulated assets are transferred to the Premium
Pension Authority. The second type of annuity,
referred to as unit-linked, does not guarantee
a benefit level. If chosen, one’s funds are kept
with fund managers, and one’s pension is recal-
culated each year by dividing the value of one’s
funds by an annuity factor. (“The Swedish
Pension Reform”) A choice must be made
between receiving a guaranteed amount or risk-
ing this guarantee in hopes of higher returns
from fund managers.
There has been much debate about why
the pension reform should include the premi-
um pension and whether or not the premium
system should be privately or publicly managed.
Arguments concerning whether or not to have
such a funded system range from concern over
its impacts on savings, investment, and the
growth of the economy to the potential for a
new source of capital for private business.
Nonetheless, some believe that, because the
debate continues as to whether pay-as-you-go
or fully funded systems provide the best pro-
tection against diverse economic and demo-
graphic risks, it is wise for the Swedish state to
diversify its risk through a mix of the two
approaches. (Scherman, p. 26)
Assessment of the Reform
From the viewpoint of Swedish society as
a whole, the new system is superior to the old
system in terms of sustainability and equity.
Nevertheless, certain groups may be disadvan-
taged as a result of the reform. In the remain-
der of this article I focus upon the winners and
losers in the reform by looking at various
design changes. 
The most important part of the reform is
undoubtedly the move from a defined benefit
system to a system characterized by fixed con-
tribution rates. The new system guarantees a
fixed contribution rate of 18.5 percent to sup-
port earnings-related pensions indefinitely, no
matter how demographics change and no mat-
ter how the economy fares. The primary goal of
the reform, financial sustainability through
fixed contribution rates, seems to have been
achieved; however, it should be noted that the
cost of the guaranteed pension could still fluc-
tuate. 
The obvious downside of abandoning the
defined benefit system is the potential for the
benefit level to decrease. During prosperous
economic times, the system will meet its oblig-
ations and enlarge its buffer fund; however, dur-
ing economic downturns, the system may be
forced to lower its level of benefits. For exam-
ple, when unemployment is high, the decreased
tax base will provide decreased net benefits for
retirees. The automatic balance mechanism will
slow benefit growth rates when tax revenues
are low, whereas the old defined-benefit system
avoided such sensitive actions by lifting con-
tribution rates to provide for guaranteed bene-
fit levels. This change benefits the current labor
force at the expense of pensioners who now face
an element of uncertainty in calculating their
pension income. 
Furthermore, the regressive redistribu-
tion that resulted from the old system’s earn-
ings-related benefit has been eliminated. The
size of one’s benefit is now a function of net
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contributions over one’s entire lifetime; there-
fore, those working more years at lower
incomes are not penalized in comparison to
those working fewer years at higher incomes.
If the assumptions described earlier are correct,
this benefits blue-collar workers at the expense
of white-collar workers. 
By tying the rate of return on contribu-
tions to wage growth rather than the wage bill,5
it would appear that reformers have created a
weakness in the new system.6 If wage growth
increases while aggregate contributions
decrease, as could easily be the case given the
dynamics of Sweden’s changing population,
then the system could quickly become unable
to meet its obligations. The reformers have
anticipated this weakness and created the auto-
matic balance mechanism, in part, to combat
it. As a result, the system will remain financially
stable, but benefit rates will be unstable. Thus,
the reform benefits the young at the expense of
the old.
Although the development of the ABM and
many other efforts have been made in order to
improve financial stability, it is worth noting
one area that may systematically continue to
be a source of problems. The income pension’s
annuity factor is calculated once, at the time of
retirement, using whatever life expectancy esti-
mate is prevailing at that time; however, life
expectancy estimates are likely to change
beyond this point in one’s life. Assuming that
technological advancements and other related
factors are likely to increase longevity over
time, the new system may consistently under-
estimate its liabilities. In order to deal with this
potential source of instability, it has been sug-
gested that benefit levels be adjusted on a reg-
ular basis, as life expectancy changes become
known. Another solution, which is probably less
accurate but easier to implement, would be to
calculate the annuity factor taking into account
expected future changes in life expectancies.
(Palmer, 2000, p. 15) Either solution would pre-
sumably improve the system and benefit the
young at the expense of the old.
A noteworthy shortcoming of the new sys-
tem is that, with the exception of those living
off the guarantee, pensioners are no longer fully
protected from inflation. This is the result of
switching from price indexation to real wage
growth indexation. It can be argued, however,
that this is a positive development. Whereas the
old system’s formula was “manipulated” during
times of economic recession in order to avoid
problems, the new system forces the retired to
share the risk of poor economic performance
along with the working population. (Scherman,
p. 19) Additionally, because the Swedish wel-
fare state provides health care to its citizens,
the elderly are not going to suffer setbacks in
physical well-being. 
All in all, those who were better off under
the old system have made sacrifices primarily
for the sake of financial sustainability.
Nevertheless, the old system will continue to
dominate Sweden’s pension costs for the next
two decades. All individuals born before 1938
remain covered entirely by the old system, and
those born between 1938 and 1953 are covered
by a combination of the two systems.7 (“The
Swedish Labour Market…,” p. 45) As a result,
the old system’s problems can still impose huge
costs on the working population. Edward
Palmer, the Head of the Division for Research
and Analysis at the Swedish National Social
Insurance Board and a Professor of Social
Insurance Economics at Uppsala University,
suggests that “this may be judged by social and
political historians to have been the major fail-
ing of the reform.” (Palmer, 2000, p. 28)
Has Sweden Improved Its Pension
System?
Sweden’s public pension reform has
achieved its primary goal. Among its advan-
tages, the new system has permanent labor
force contribution rates and is financially sus-
tainable. The system’s liabilities will now grow
with real wages, the source of the system’s
5The wage bill is defined as the sum of earnings across
the country.
6See Andrew Bond’s “Crisis, Pension, and Achieving
Financial Stability in the Italian Pension System,” in Volume
21 of Perspectives on Business and Economics for a descrip-
tion of how the alternate approach was implemented in the
recent Italian pension system reform.
7These transition rules were adopted in order to be fair
to older Swedes who have long planned their retirement
years based upon the old system’s rules. 
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assets, instead of with prices. Also, unlike its
predecessor, the new system will adjust benefit
levels rather than contribution rates in order
to cope with a population that is living longer,
having fewer children, and retiring earlier.
Although benefit levels will be uncertain, slow
transition rules allow time for citizens to adjust
their savings habits in preparation for retire-
ment. 
The winners and losers are clear.
Contributors no longer have to worry about
escalating contribution rates, but recipients
must worry more about their retirement
income. Additionally, blue-collar workers 
gain at the expense of white-collar workers,
since the design is no longer systematically
regressive. 
Despite great advancements in financial
sustainability, the new system would be vul-
nerable to collapse without its automatic bal-
ance mechanism. Changes in the size of the
labor force and, more specifically, the wage bill
may cause the automatic balance mechanism
to activate. Similarly, the ABM may be neces-
sary to combat consistently underestimated life
expectancies and lingering transition rules. 
In short, the reform was necessary, appro-
priate, and successful, but it has its downside.
Other nations facing similar problems can
hopefully learn from the Swedish reform.
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